Professional Responsibility by Cunningham, Clark D.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room




Georgia State University College of Law, cdcunningham@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation




I. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1005
II. LEGAL ETmcs .................................................. 1010
A. Unauthorized Practice of Law ..................... 1011
B. Conflict of Interest .................................... 1014
C. Client Trends ............................................ 1017
III. ATTORNEY DIscLINE ....................................... 1021
A. Grounds for Discipline ............................... 1021
B. Procedure ................................................. 1022
C. Sanctions .................................................. 1024
D. Immunity ................................................. 1028
IV. ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE ................................... 1028
A. Limitations Period ..................................... 1029
B. Causation ................................................. 1029
I. INTRODUCTION
This issue marks the first annual Survey of Michigan law
regarding legal ethics and the regulation of attorney conduct since
1982. Accordingly, a brief overview of the subject is appropriate
before reviewing developments in the law during the Survey pe-
riod.'
t Clinical Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School;
Adjunct Professor, Wayne State University Law School. B.A. 1975, Dartmouth
College; J.D. 1981, Wayne State University. Professor Cunningham is a hearing
panel member of the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board. Linda K. Rexer,
Executive Director, Interest on Lawyer Trust Account Program, Michigan State
Bar Foundation, and John F. Van Bolt, Executive Director and General Counsel,
Michigan Attorney Discipline Board, both provided invaluable source material
and advice for the preparation of this Article. The opinions and errors contained
herein are, of course, to be attributed only to the author.
1. The leading article on the subject continues to be Dubin & Schwartz,
Survey and Analysis of Michigan's Disciplinary System for Lawyers, 61 U. DET.
J. URB. L. 1 (1983). When the article was published Professor Lawrence Dubin
was the Vice Chairperson of the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission.
Michael Alan Schwartz was and continues to be the Administrator of the Attorney
Grievance Commission. The Michigan Bar Journal has also published several
issues devoted to this area of Michigan law. See, Attorney Malpractice, 65 Mic.
B.J. 276 (1985); Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 64 Micn. B.J. 276 (1985);
Lawyering, 63 MicH. B.J. 235 (1984).
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The Michigan Supreme Court interprets its constitutional
mandate2 to include the regulation of the practice of law in
Michigan.3 Therefore, the court serves as the major source of
positive law on this subject through the promulgation of rules,
administrative orders, decisions in contested cases, and decisions
by agencies created by the court to exercise its delegated authority.
Unlike many state bars, the State Bar of Michigan, an integrated
bar association, 4 has had no authority in this area since 1970.1
The Michigan Court of Appeals and lower courts in Michigan also
have no role in attorney discipline.
During the Survey period, the primary source of substantive
law for lawyer conduct was the Michigan Code of Professional
Responsibility (Michigan Code), which the Michigan Supreme Court
adopted in 1971.6 On March 11, 1988, as the Survey issue was
going to press, the Michigan Supreme Court repealed the Michigan
Code and replaced it with the Michigan Rules of Professional
Conduct (MRPC), effective October 1, 1988. The Michigan Code
is based on the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code) developed by the American Bar Association (ABA) and
approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 1970. The Michigan
Code is divided into nine sections, each headed by different one-
sentence maxims of legal ethics called "Canons." Each section
contains one or more mandatory rules of professional conduct,
called "Disciplinary Rules," numbered sequentially beginning with
2. MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
3. See In re Grimes, 414 Mich. 483, 326 N.W.2d 380 reh'g denied, 417
Mich. 1101, 327 N.W.2d 314 (1982); In re Mills, 1 Mich. 392 (1850); see also
Dubin & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1, 4.
4. An "integrated" bar association is a jurisdiction-wide bar organization
that requires bar membership in order to practice in that jurisdiction. Unlike
voluntary bar associations, such as the American Bar Association and the Detroit
Bar Association, integrated bar associations are generally created by the authority
of a court or a legislature. Because integrated bar associations receive their
authority from these official origins, these bar associations are frequently clothed
with state power in relation to the licensing and regulation of attorneys.
5. The State Bar had the power and responsibility of disciplining Michigan
lawyers from 1935-1970. For an account of the reasons why the supreme court
removed this power and transferred it to its own agencies, see Dubin & Schwartz,
supra note 1, at 2-3.
6. The Code may be located in various publications. See, e.g., MIcmoAN
RuLEs OF COURT 1987 1355-83 (1987) (reprinting MICMGAN CODE OF PROFSSIONAr.
RESPONSIBLrry (1987)). The text of the newly adopted Michigan Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility will appear in the June 1988 issue of the Michigan Bar




"101" for each section with a numerical prefix identifying the
Canon under which the rule falls. For example, the first Discipli-
nary Rule in the first Canon is cited as DR 1-101.
Most states joined Michigan in adopting the ABA Model Code
in the early 1970s. There are, however, several important differ-
ences between the Michigan Code and the ABA Model Code. The
ABA Model Code contains in each section, in addition to Canons
and Disciplinary Rules, a number of one-paragraph expositions on
legal ethics called "Ethical Considerations." The purpose of the
Ethical Considerations is to supplement the mandatory Disciplinary
Rules with aspirational objectives that are not a basis for discipline
but rather serve to guide conduct. The Michigan Supreme Court,
without explanation, declined to adopt the Ethical Considerations.7
A second point of divergence between the Michigan Code and
the Model Code developed in 1974 when the ABA amended DR
7-102(B)(1) to exempt an attorney from the duty of disclosing a
client's fraudulent conduct, including perjury, if disclosure would
violate the duty of confidentiality set out in DR 4-101.8 The
Michigan Supreme Court declined to adopt this amendment; thus
under the Michigan Code attorneys are required to breach client
confidentiality if necessary to rectify client fraud perpetrated in
the course of representation.
The third major difference9 between the Michigan Code and
the Model Code was created by Administrative Order -1978-4, which
the Michigan Supreme Court issued in 1978. The order suspended
DR 2-101 and DR 2-102, regulating attorney advertising, and
replaced these rules with a blanket approval of "the use of any
form of public communication that is not false, fraudulent, mis-
leading, or deceptive."' 1 The order is currently in effect."
7. A number of commentators have criticized the Ethical Considerations
as confusing rather than clarifying the Model Code. Dissatisfaction with the
tripartite structure of the Model Code (Canons, Ethical Considerations, and
Disciplinary Rules) was one of the reasons the ABA reviewed and ultimately
discarded the Model Code within 13 years of its creation.
8. For an explanation of this amendment, see ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (on file at The Wayne
Law Review). Compare Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicH. L. Rv. 1469 (1966)
with Nix v. Whiteside, 457 U.S. 157 (1986).
9. Other differences can be found in DR 2-106(C) and DR 5-105(D).
10. Admin. Order No. 1978-4, 402 Mich. lxxxvi (1978). The impetus for
Administrative Order 1987-4 was the decision in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350 (1977), in which the court held that the first amendment protects attorney
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The Michigan Code is not accompanied by any comments or
advisory committee notes. Thus, the only legislative history derives
from the development of the ABA Model Code, which served as
the basis for the Michigan Code.12 The Michigan Code receives
authoritative interpretation in the disciplinary process. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court has delegated attorney discipline to two agen-
cies: the Attorney Grievance Commission (Grievance Commission)
and the Attorney Discipline Board (Board).13 The Grievance Com-
mission, through its Administrator and staff, investigates and
prosecutes complaints of attorney misconduct. Should the Griev-
ance Commission elect to proceed with a formal complaint of
misconduct, the Board will appoint a hearing panel consisting of
three attorneys to adjudicate the discipline case. Each hearing
panel is empowered to make findings of fact and law and to
impose discipline. The complainant, the respondent attorney, and
the Grievance Commission all have the right to petition the Board
to review a panel's decision. The decision of the Board is final
unless the supreme court grants leave to appeal, which is a rare
occurrence.
Because the supreme court rarely considers an attorney disci-
pline case, the decisions of the Board would appear to constitute
the major source for interpreting the Michigan Code. Unfortu-
nately, to date, the Board's opinions are neither available in an
official reporter nor indexed in a standard annotation or a treatise
on Michigan law. 14 The Board published all its opinions rendered
advertising and, therefore, DR 2-101 and DR-102 may not be imposed to punish
attorneys who advertise their legal fees. Administrative Order 1978-4, however,
left in place both DR 2-103 and DR 2-104, which prohibit solicitation. See MBA
Comm. on Judicial and Professional Ethics, Formal Op. C-236 (1985), reprinted
in Ethics Opinion-Formal Opinion C-236, 65 Mlcii. B.J. 97 (1986) (DR 2-103
and DR 2-104 should continue to be enforced with regard to personal solicitation
but should not be construed to prevent truthful and non-deceptive advertising).
11. See Admin. Order No. 1979-3, 405 Mich. lviii (1979); Admin. Order
No. 1979-7, 407 Mich. lxxii (1979).
12. The most important sources for interpreting the ABA Model Code are
the ABA Formal Ethics Opinions, including those ethics opinions that interpreted
the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics, which preceded the Model Code, and those
that have interpreted the Model Code itself.
13. Mcra. CT. R. 9.101-.131. A complete, albeit slightly dated, account
of the Michigan disciplinary procedure, including descriptions of the operations
of both the Grievance Commission and the Board, is found in Dubin & Schwartz,
supra note 1, at 3-29.
14. The Michigan Bar Journal publishes each order of discipline, whether
imposed by a hearing panel or the Board. However, these orders usually describe
1008 [Vol. 34:1005
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since its creation in 1978 through December 1985 in a bound
volume. 5 This publication is currently out of print although law
schools and most bar libraries may have copies. Board opinions
issued since January of 1986 are available only in slip form from
the Board itself and are not indexed.' 6 Even if Board opinions
were accessible, their utility as an interpretive guide to the Michigan
Code would be limited because, rather than focusing on the
substantive principles of legal ethics, the Board tends to be pre-
occupied with petitions to increase or decrease discipline imposed
by the hearing panels.
Due to the lack of reported decisions interpreting the Michigan
Code, the State Bar of Michigan continues to serve an important
role despite its lack of official authority to enforce the Code. The
State Bar maintains an active Committee on Professional and
Judicial Ethics composed of at least three members of the judiciary.
The Committee issues written opinions on request concerning the
propriety of contemplated professional conduct. The Committee
will not respond to requests regarding conduct that has already
taken place or to inquiries by one attorney regarding the conduct
of another. 17 Most of the Committee's opinions are "informal
opinions" addressed primarily to the requesting party. If the
Committee believes an opinion addresses a situation that is of
general interest to the public or the profession, the Committee will
forward the opinion to the State Bar's governing body, the Board
of Commissioners. s If approved by the Board of Commissioners,
such opinions become "formal opinions" and are published in the
Michigan Bar Journal. Because formal State Bar opinions are
published in a form accessible to all Michigan attorneys and address
difficult and important substantive issues of legal ethics, they form
the finding of misconduct in a cursory manner and are useless as precedent.
Efforts are currently underway to secure publication of the Board's opinions in
an official reporter.
15. The index to this volume is organized idiosyncratically and is difficult
to use. The volume does not include an indexed digest of opinions.
16. Board opinions surveyed in this Article are on file at The Wayne Law
Review.
17. MBA Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Rule 2 Duties of
Committees. This self-imposed restraint, which prevents the State Bar from
encroaching into the area of attorney discipline, is consistent with MicH. CT. R.
9.107(B) (local bar association may not conduct separate proceeding to discipline
attorney).
18. MBA Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Rule 4 Considera-
tion of Requests.
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a body of interpretative authority apparently more influential than
the decisions of the Attorney Discipline Board. 19 For this reason,
this Survey will include both unpublished Board opinions and
published formal State Bar opinions.
A final source of interpretive guidance for the Michigan Code
is found in court decisions that refer to the Michigan Code in
non-disciplinary contexts. The most important collateral use of the
Michigan Code is found in lawyer malpractice cases. 20 Under
Michigan law, a violation of the Michigan Code is rebuttable
evidence of malpractice. 2' Accordingly, malpractice cases are in-
cluded in this Survey because these cases often result in persuasive
judicial interpretation of the duties imposed by the Michigan Code.
This Article also reviews malpractice decisions because the potential
of malpractice liability may in practice regulate attorney conduct
at least as powerfully as the risk of formal attorney discipline
proceedings.
II. LEGAL ETmCS
The most important development in Michigan's substantive law
of legal ethics took place outside the Survey period when the
Michigan Supreme Court decided to replace the Michigan Code
with the MRPC, as discussed above. During the Survey period,
the court amended one section of the Michigan Code regarding
client funds.? Also during this period the State Bar interpreted a
provision prohibiting aiding in the unauthorized practice of law. 24
In addition, the Board issued two opinions that focused on conflicts
of interest.
19. It is entirely proper for the State Bar to express its own opinions as
to the meaning of the Michigan Code even though these opinions are binding on
no one. While the Board would not likely discipline attorneys who rely in good
faith on a State Bar ethics opinion, the Board would clearly be free to reject the
State Bar's interpretation of any Disciplinary Rule.
20. Other collateral uses of the Michigan Code include decisions involving
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases and motions to
disqualify opposing counsel.
21. Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 597-98, 313 N.W.2d 163, 166-
67 (1981). However, the Preliminary Statement to the Model Code explicitly
states that the Model Code does not define standards for civil malpractice liability.
MODEL CODE OF PRomssroNAL REsPoNsmmrry, Preamble and Preliminary State-
ment (1982)
22. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
23. MICHIGAN CODE OF PRoFEssioNA. RESPONs5ILIrY DR 9-102 (1987).
24. Id. DR 3-101.
1010 [Vol. 34:1005
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Unauthorized Practice of Law
Canon Three of the Michigan Code states that "a lawyer
should assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of law.'25
This Canon is implemented by DR 3-101(A): "A lawyer shall not
aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law." As is
often the case, the language of the implementing rule is much
narrower than that of the underlying Canon. Disciplinary Rule 3-
101(A) literally only prohibits certain action, such as aiding a non-
lawyer engaged in unauthorized practice, while Canon Three urges
an affirmative duty to take action, such as assisting in the preven-
tion of unauthorized practice. In Formal Opinion C-239, 27 issued
on September 3, 1986, the State Bar effectively read into DR 3-
101(A) the affirmative duty imposed by Canon Three: "We believe
that DR 3-101(A) ... requires more of a lawyer than simply
avoiding active assistance to unauthorized practice. It is our opin-
ion that an attorney has an ethical obligation to employ appropriate
means to prevent unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers."' '
Opinion C-239 was based on rather unusual facts. A member
of the State Bar serving as an administrative law judge (ALJ)
reported to the State Bar Committee on Unauthorized Practice the
fact that a state agency which was a party to the proceedings
before the AJ was represented by a non-lawyer agency employee.
It is not clear whether the ALJ also separately requested an ethics
opinion or whether the ethical issue was referred to the Ethics
Committee by the Committee on Unauthorized Practice.
25. Id. Canon 3. The statutory prohibition on the unauthorized practice
of law applies to persons who are not licensed to practice law in Michigan.
MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.916 (West 1981). The Michigan Code thus enlists
attorneys in the enforcement of the statute. Michigan law is conspicuously vague
in the definition of what constitutes the "practice of law." See State Bar v.
Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 133, 249 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1976) (per curiam) ("No essential
definition of the practice of law has been articulated and the descriptive definitions
which have been agreed upon from time to time have only permitted disposition
of specific questions.").
26. MICHIOAN CODE OF PROFESsioNAL RE poNsmrry DR 3-101 (A) (1987).
The second part of this rule, id. DR 3-101(B), prohibits lawyers from practicing
contrary to the regulations of the jurisdiction. The other two rules in Canon
Three prohibit a lawyer from either dividing legal fees with a non-lawyer, id.
DR 3-102, or forming a law partnership with a non-lawyer. Id. DR 3-103.
27. MBA Comm on Judicial and Professional Ethics, Formal Op. C-239
(1986), reprinted in Ethics Opinion- Formal Opinion C-239, 65 MIcH. B.J. 1198
(1986) [hereinafter Formal Opinion C-239].
28. Id.
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Three questions were addressed to the Ethics Committee: (1)
whether the appearance of a non-lawyer employee of a state agency
in a representative capacity constituted unauthorized practice; (2)
whether a lawyer has an ethical duty to prevent unauthorized
practice; and (3) if there is an ethical duty to prevent unauthorized
practice, what actions must a lawyer take. The Ethics Committee
declined to answer the first question on the grounds that it was
beyond its jurisdiction.29 After noting that there was little authority
for interpreting DR 3-101(A) beyond "simply refraining from
assisting unauthorized practice,' '30 the Ethics Committee concluded
that the rule imposed an affirmative duty to prevent unauthorized
practice. The Ethics Committee opined that the lawyer-ALJ suf-
ficiently discharged that duty by reporting the conduct of the non-
lawyer to the Committee on Unauthorized Conduct, but only
because it was not clear that the conduct constituted unauthorized
practice of law. Had the conduct fallen "within accepted judicial
and/or legislative definitions of unauthorized practice" the ALJ
should not have allowed the non-lawyer to represent the state
agency in the administrative proceedings. 31
There are three troubling aspects to Formal Opinion C-239.
First, the opinion effectively substitutes the language of Canon
Three for that of DR 3-103(A), thus subverting the functional
distinction between Canons and Disciplinary Rules in the Michigan
Code. As explained in the Preamble to the Model Code, the
Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in
general terms the standards of professional conduct ex-
29. Id. The State Bar enforces the statutory prohibition on unauthorized
practice by initiating a contempt action in the appropriate circuit court. Micn.
Cor. LAws ANN. § 600.916 (West 1981). The State Bar delegated this power
to its Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, not the Ethics Committee.
Further, the Ethics Committee routinely declines to interpret statutes or other
sources of law other than the Code itself. In the particular facts giving rise to
this opinion, the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law declined to
prosecute the non-lawyer state employee. Formal Opinion C-239, supra note 27,
at 1198.
30. Formal Opinion C-239, supra note 27, at 1198. The only authorities
cited in Formal Op. C-239 on this point were two informal ethics opinions, MBA
Comm. on Judicial and Professional Ethics, Informal Op. CI-404 (1979) and id.,
Informal Op. CI-551 (1980), which "assumed, without discussion, an obligation
to do what is in one's power to prevent unauthorized practice." Formal Opinion
C-239, supra note 27, at 1198. Both of these informal opinions also concluded
that a lawyer serving as an ALJ was prohibited by DR 3-101(A) from allowing
a non-lawyer to practice law before the ALJ.
31. Formal Opinion C-239, supra note 27, at 1198-99.
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pected of lawyers ... [and] embody the general concepts
from which ... the Disciplinary Rules are derived . . .
[the] Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct
below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action. 2
The Canons urge a standard of behavior much more demanding,
albeit more vague, than the disciplinary rules that follow them. 33
They are hortatory, not mandatory: the Canons always use the
verb "should" while the disciplinary rules consistently use "shall."
The differing language of Canon Three and DR 3-103(A)
clearly reflects this functional difference. Although lawyers are
exhorted by Canon Three to assist in preventing unauthorized
practice, DR 3-103(A) would discipline only lawyers who actually
aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. Formal
Opinion C-239 erases the distinction by interpreting DR 3-103(A),
contrary to its carefully drafted language, as if it read like Canon
Three. This interpretation subjects lawyers to potential discipline
if they are aware of unauthorized practice of law and do not
attempt to prevent it, even if they play no role in supporting such
practice by a non-lawyer.3 4
The second troubling aspect of Formal Opinion C-239 is an
apparent insensitivity to the necessary autonomy of administrative
law judges and other adjudicatory officials who are lawyers only
incidentally. An ALJ should decide whether a state agency can be
represented by a non-lawyer based only on the controlling admin-
istrative law, free of any implied threat to personal discipline as
a lawyer for conduct taken entirely in a judicial capacity. A
restrained interpretation of DR 3-103(A), in which the ALJ would
not be aiding the non-lawyer by merely permitting him to represent
the State in proceedings before the ALJ, would have avoided this
potential problem. This interpretation would relieve the ALJ from
the threat of personal discipline despite the fact that the ALJ
might have failed to comply with Canon Three which requires him
to exercise judicial power to prevent such representation.
32. MODEL CODE OF PRofessIoNA REsPoNsIBmrrY, Preamble and Prelim-
inary Statement (1982).
33. See, e.g., id. Canon 8 ("A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the
Legal System"); id. Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance
of Professional Impropriety").
34. Of course, as explained supra note 5 and accompanying text, the State
Bar has no role in attorney discipline and its ethics opinions are not binding on
either the Attorney Grievance Commission or the Attorney Discipline Board.
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The third and final unsettling implication is the self- serving
appearance of this ethics opinion. A variety of commentators have
criticized the preoccupation of bar organizations with preventing
unauthorized practice of law as motivated by monopoly interests
rather than a desire to protect the public.35 Lawyers in Michigan
do not enjoy an exclusive monopoly on representation in admin-
istrative proceedings. Persons who contest the conduct of state
agencies or are compelled to appear before state agencies are
frequently authorized by statute or regulation to use non-lawyers
to represent them.3 6 Since non-lawyers may represent individuals
in this context, it is unclear why state agencies cannot be permitted
a similar option. Surely state agencies are capable of protecting
their own interests without the assistance of the State Bar.37 In the
leading case of State Bar v. Cramer,38 the Michigan Supreme Court
said that the statutory prohibition on unauthorized practice of law
must be construed with the purpose of protecting the public.3 9 Yet,
the ABA's most recent discussion of professional responsibility
and attorney discipline described DR 3-101 as exemplifying a duty
to the legal profession, not to the public.40 Formal Opinion C-239
is evidence that self-protection of the profession's monopoly rather
than public protection remains the driving force behind the inter-
pretation and enforcement of DR 3-101.
B. Conflict of Interest
Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A) sets out a general rule prohibiting
lawyers from accepting employment if their own financial or
35. See, e.g., M.S. FRIEnmAN, CAPrr .sM AND FREEDOM 144-49 (1962);
Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1981);
Address by Clark Durant, Chairman of the Legal Services Corporation, ABA
Mid-Winter Meeting, "Maximizing Access to Justice: A Challenge to the Legal
Profession" (Feb. 12, 1987).
36. An extensive list of federal and Michigan administrative agencies that
allow lay representation can be found in Justice Levin's dissent in Cramer, 399
Mich. at 158-59 n.24, 249 N.W.2d at 18-19 n.24.
37. The Michigan Attorney General forwarded his views on this case to
the Ethics Committee, taking the position that an agency may decide under its
own rules who may practice before it. Although admitting that the issue was
beyond its jurisdiction, the Committee nonetheless felt obliged to address the
Attorney General's position in a footnote, asserting that his position "is open to
very serious question." Formal Opinion C-239, supra note 27, at 1199, n.2.
38. 399 Mich. 116, 249 N.W.2d 1 (1976) (per curiam).
39. Id. at 134, 249 N.W.2d at 7.




personal interests might affect their representation of the client. A
more specific statement of this general principle is found in DR
5-104(A), which prohibits business transactions with a client if the
lawyer and the client have differing interests and the client expects
the lawyer to exercise professional judgment on the client's behalf
in the transaction. The client may waive both prohibitions after
full disclosure by the lawyer of the potential conflict of interest.
Two decisions of the Attorney Discipline Board during the Survey
period represent the continuing trend toward limiting the client
consent exception that permits representation when the attorney
has a personal financial stake.
In Schwartz v. Williams" the respondent attorney borrowed
$17,000 from his client out of settlement proceeds and gave a
mortgage on his own home as security. The lawyer failed to make
payment when due, forcing the client to hire another attorney in
order to foreclose. The respondent successfully defended the fore-
closure on the ground that the mortgage interest rate was usuri-
ous.42 The Board found a violation of DR 5-104(A) because the
client had relied on the attorney's professional judgment in ne-
gotiating the mortgage. The attorney's failure to disclose that the
negotiated interest rate was usurious and could be forfeited if the
mortgage was litigated vitiated the client's consent.43 The Board
used the Williams case as an opportunity to warn attorneys bor-
rowing money from clients to be prepared to establish a high
degree of good faith." This warning is consistent with the higher
standards that will be imposed on attorneys under Michigan Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.8(a),45 which prohibits business trans-
41. Schwartz v. Williams, No. DP 197/85 (Mich. Att. Discipline Bd. filed
May 20, 1987) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
42. In the foreclosure action, the court reformed the mortgage interest
rate from 140 to 7%Vo. Although the mortgage note called for full payment within
six months, the reformed balance was not paid until the last day of the redemption
period, three and a half years later. The client was forced to expend $4,000 in
attorney fees to collect on the mortgage.
43. The Board found additional violations of the Michigan Code resulting
from the fact that the respondent damaged his client during the course of the
professional relationship, MICHIGAN CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-101(A)(3) (1980), knowingly failed to disclose that which by law he was required
to reveal, id. DR 7-102(A)(3), and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, id.
DR 1-102(A)(4).
44. Williams, No. DP 197/85, at 1.
45. MicmGAN RurEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
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actions with a client even with disclosure and client consent unless
the transaction is fair and the client is given the opportunity to
seek independent legal advice. 46 Unfortunately the stern language
of the Board in Williams was undermined by the lenient sanction
imposed-a suspension of less than four months.47
In Schwartz v. Doherty,48 the Board took the unusual step of
dismissing the Grievance Administrator's complaint against the
respondent while at the same time using the case to warn the
profession against engaging in the charged conduct. The respondent
attorney had drafted several wills and a revocable living trust for
a client naming the respondent and his wife as the sole beneficiaries
in these instruments. Because the respondent's representation of
his client might reasonably have been affected by his financial
interest as beneficiary, DR 5-101(A) would have been violated
absent client consent following full disclosure of the potential
conflict of interest. The Board's decision in Doherty inexplicably
made no reference to DR 5-101(A) and, in addition, the Board
made no specific finding that the disclosure and consent require-
ments had been met. Instead, the Board merely reaffirmed its
prior decision, In re Watson,49 in which it established a per se rule
interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the
interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably
understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice
of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
46. The Board pointed out that the respondent might have avoided these
disciplinary proceedings had he simply referred his client to another attorney for
advice on negotiating the mortgage. Williams, No DP 197/85, at 2.
47. The Williams matter came before the Board on the Grievance Admin-
istrator's appeal seeking increased discipline. The Board affirmed the panel order
suspending the respondent for 119 days, thus allowing the respondent automatic
reinstatement at the end of the suspension period. Had the panel suspended the
respondent for 120 days or more, under the then-applicable rules, the respondent
would have been required to petition for reinstatement and establish fitness to
practice law. The Board noted that the discipline imposed by the panel "could
have been more severe" but deferred to the panel's decision to give mitigating
weight to the respondent's claimed alcoholism, subsequent rehabilitation, and
efforts to discharge his financial obligations. Id.
48. Schwartz v. Doherty, No. DP 153/84 (Mich. Att. Discipline Bd. filed
Sept. 30, 1986) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
49. No. DP 209/82 (Mich. Att. Discipline Bd.) (July 18, 1983), leave to
app. denied, 418 Mich. 1201 (1984).
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that a lawyer who drafts a will naming himself as a beneficiary is
guilty of misconduct absent exceptional circumstances. The Watson
rule was neither based on DR 5-101(A) nor any other conflict of
interest rule, but rather on the Code's general prohibitions of
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or adversely
reflecting on fitness to practice law.50
The Board, however, affirmed the panel decision dismissing
the complaint against the respondent on the ground that the
Watson rule, announced in 1983, should not apply retroactively
in this case because the respondent drafted the instruments in 1979
and 1980. The panel's decision had been based on the respondent's
rebuttal of a presumption of undue influence.51
Despite the dismissal of the Grievance Administrator's com-
plaint, the thrust of Doherty condemned the respondent's conduct
and reemphasized the "specific warning" to the profession issued
in Watson. Unfortunately, the unpublished character of the Board's
decisions and limited distribution make these "warnings" ineffec-
tive as a practical matter. The issue will be resolved by Michigan
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(c), which categorically prohibits
a lawyer from preparing an instrument-including a will-that
gives the lawyer or specified close relatives of the lawyer any
substantial gift unless the client is related to the donee.52
C. Client Funds
On March 16, 1987 the Michigan Supreme Court amended the
section of the Michigan Code, DR 9-102, which governs the
handling of client funds and property.5 3 The purpose of this
amendment was to require attorneys to deposit all client funds,
other than advances for costs and expenses, into interest-bearing
50. See MIcHIGAN CODE or PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (A)(5)-(6), 7-101(A)(3) (1987). Watson also cited In re Powers Estate, 375 Mich. 150,
134 N.W.2d 148 (1965); Abrey v. Duffield, 149 Mich. 248, 259, 112 N.W. 936,
939-40 (1907); In re Estate of Karabatian, 17 Mich. App. 541, 170 N.W.2d 166
(1959).
51. The Board decision is silent as to the evidence which supported the
panel's conclusion that there was no undue influence.
52. MRPC 1.8(c) is properly placed under the heading "Conflict of
Interest: Prohibited Transactions," showing the derivation of the prohibition
from the general principle enunciated in DR 5-101(A).
53. Administrative Order No. 1987-3, 428 Mich. cxxxvi (1987); For back-
ground information on the Michigan IOLTA program, see Michigan State Bar
Foundation, Michigan IOLTA, The First Year 1987 (Jan. 1988) [hereinafter cited
as Michigan IOLTA] (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
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accounts and to divert interest earned on nominal funds to sub-
sidize law-related charitable activities, primarily civil legal services
to the poor. The amendment made Michigan the forty-fourth state
to adopt what is known as an Interest on Lawyer Trust Account
(IOLTA) program.
IOLTA programs are designed to replace the reduction in
federal funding of low-income legal services programs under the
Reagan administration. IOLTA is attractive because it promises to
generate significant funds for legal aid-possibly more than $1
million per year in Michigan alone-at no cost to lawyers, their
clients, or the public. This feat is accomplished by pooling small
and short-term client trust fund deposits into a single interest
bearing account with interest paid directly to the Michigan Bar
Foundation. Without pooling the trust funds would not yield net
interest to individual clients because the bank charges would exceed
the very nominal interest earned by any given small or short-term
deposit. Principles of fiduciary responsibility prevent attorneys
from using interest earned even on pooled client funds. 54 The
IOLTA concept turns this dilemma to constructive use by diverting
the interest on such pooled trust funds to charitable purposes,
primarily legal services to the poor.55
The court amended DR 9-102(A) to require that all client
funds, other than advances for costs and expenses, be deposited
in interest-bearing accounts unless the client directs otherwise.56
Disciplinary Rule 9-102(C) now requires that client funds "which
at the time of receipt and deposit the lawyer ... reasonably
anticipates will generate $50 or less in interest during the period
for which it is anticipated such funds are to be held" are to be
deposited in a pooled interest-bearing trust account with interest
paid to the Michigan State Bar Foundation. 57 A lawyer may not
54. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 348 (1982).
55. Constitutional challenges to the IOLTA programs have failed because
clients lack any property interest in the interest earned on small and short-term
deposits since such interest is smaller than the administrative costs of identifying
and paying it to the client. See Cone v. State Bar, 819 F.2d 1002 (1lth Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987); Carroll v. State Bar, 166 Cal. 3d 1193, 213
Cal. Rptr. 305, cert. denied sub nom. Chapman v. State Bar, 474 U.S. 848
(1985).
56. Prior to amendment, DR 9-102(A) required that client funds be
deposited in identifiable bank accounts but did not specify that the accounts be
interest-bearing.
57. MiCmGAN CODE OF PRoFEssoNAL REsPON5smuLrry DR 9-102(C) (1987).
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be disciplined for a good faith, albeit mistaken, decision as to
whether client funds will generate $50 or less in interest.5 8 Client
funds need not be deposited in an IOLTA account if: (1) the client
directs that the funds not be placed in an interest-bearing account;
(2) a separate interest-bearing account is established for the specific
client with interest paid to the client; or (3) the funds are deposited
in a pooled interest-bearing account with subaccounting that pro-
vides for payment to the client of interest attributable to the
client's funds. 9
Concurrent with the amendment of DR 9-102, the court issued
Administrative Order 1987-3, which assigned administration of the
Lawyer Trust Account Program to the Michigan State Bar Foun-
dation. In addition to various administrative directions, the Order
provides that the Foundation shall disburse not less than 800o of
the IOLTA interest received to support the delivery of civil legal
services to the poor and not more than 200%0 to support the general
purposes of the Foundation 0
The effective date of Administrative Order 1987-3 has been
repeatedly delayed: from July 1, 1987 to October 1, 1987,61 then
from October 1, 1987 to January 1, 1988,62 and most recently
from January 1, 1988 until further order of the court.6 3 The
primary reason for these delays has been the time necessary to
obtain certain legal rulings. IOLTA works when federal banking
agencies have granted exceptions to the general prohibition against
interest-bearing (NOW) accounts for most commercial purposes,
such as law firms. While those exceptions have now been granted
for Michigan's IOLTA program, one major ruling remains to be
obtained before IOLTA can become operational. The program is
currently on hold pending an IRS ruling on the potential federal
tax implications of the client opt-out provision in DR 9-102(C)(2),
which is unique to Michigan's IOLTA program. Although consid-
erable variation exists among states as to whether attorney partic-
58. Id. DR 9-102(C)(1)(b).
59. Id. DR 9-102(C)(2).
60. The general purposes of the Foundation include improving the admin-
istration of justice, advancing the science of jurisprudence, and preserving the
American constitutional form of government.
61. In re Amendment to DR 9-102 (order entered May 8, 1987), reprinted
in Michigan IOLTA, supra note 53, Appendix 4.
62. In re Amendment to DR 9-102 (order entered September 1, 1987),
reprinted in Michigan IOLTA, supra note 53, Appendix 4.
63. In Re Amendment to DR 9-102 (order entered October 23, 1987),
reprinted in Michigan IOLTA. supra note 53 Appendix 4.
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ipation in IOLTA is voluntary or mandatory, only Michigan gives
the client the choice of directing that the funds, including small
or short-term funds, not be deposited in an IOLTA account. This
element of client control may cause the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to treat IOLTA interest as client income on the theory that
the client's failure to exercise the opt-out choice makes the interest
paid to the Bar Foundation a voluntary donation by the client. 64
Should the IRS treat IOLTA interest as client income, Michigan's
IOLTA program may be doomed to failure because the cost of
tracking and reporting the nominal interest earned on behalf of
each client will exceed the interest itself, thus destroying the
economic premise for the IOLTA approach.
With information from tax counsel, the Bar Foundation peti-
tioned the court to delete the client opt-out provision in 9-102(C)(2).
The court denied the petition in the fall of 1987 without expla-
nation. This denial may best be understood in light of the history
surrounding the adoption of the IOLTA program in Michigan. In
January of 1983 the Representative Assembly of the State Bar
adopted a proposal from the State Bar Legal Aid Committee to
establish a mandatory IOLTA program. In July of 1983 the State
Bar petitioned the court to adopt amendments to DR 9-102 creating
the program. In October of 1983 the court ordered the proposal
published for comment, but subsequently declined to adopt the
proposal without written explanation. In April of 1986 the State
Bar again petitioned the court to adopt an IOLTA program and
on December 11, 1986 the court entered Administrative Order
1986-2,65 amending DR 9-102 in essentially the same way as Ad-
ministrative Order 1987-3, which superseded it. Adoption was on
a five to two vote, with Justices Levin and Griffin dissenting. 66
The client opt-out provision, which had not appeared in the State
Bar proposal, may have been a necessary compromise to obtain
64. In an IRS letter ruling which established that the interest paid over to
the bar foundation participating in the particular IOLTA program under review
was not includible in the gross income of either the client or the law ftirm and
thus need not be reported by the bank or law firm on Form 1099, it was
apparently material that "[n]o client may individually elect whether to participate
in the program." IRS Letter Ruling 8730033, (April 27, 1987).
65. Admin. Order No. 1986-2, superseded by Admin. Order No. 1987-3,
428 Mich. at cxxxiv (1987).
66. Chief Justice Riley had dissented from Administrative Order 1986-2,
id. She concurred in Administrative Order No. 1987-3, making clear her continued
opposition to the IOLTA concept, saying: "What is not ours we cannot give
away, no matter how laudable the purpose." 428 Mich. at cxxxiv (1987).
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the bare majority needed to adopt an IOLTA program. 67 If so,
the court's refusal to drop the opt-out provision despite the po-
tentially adverse tax implications that threaten the success of the
IOLTA program is more comprehensible. The court may also
simply want to force the State Bar Foundation to return to the
IRS for relief, in the hope that the IRS will clarify or alter its
current position. In the meantime, unless the IRS renders a fa-
vorable ruling, the effective date of the IOLTA program, and the
amendments to DR 9-102, will continue to be delayed.
III. ATTORNEY DIscIPLINE
The major changes to the Michigan law of attorney discipline
during the Survey period were accomplished through a number of
amendments to Michigan Court Rules (MCR) Chapter 9, which
became effective June 1, 1987. In addition, the Board issued a
trilogy of decisions mandating minimum sanctions to be imposed
on a defaulting respondent.
A. Grounds for Discipline
The Michigan Supreme Court amended MCR 9.10468 to make
an adjudication of misconduct in another state or a federal court
conclusive proof of misconduct for purposes of Michigan disci-
pline. Michigan Court Rule 9.104 prevents an attorney disciplined
in another jurisdiction from collaterally attacking the prior finding
of misconduct in a Michigan disciplinary proceeding. As a result,
the only issues to be decided in the Michigan proceeding are
whether the attorney received due process in the earlier proceeding
and whether imposition of the identical discipline in Michigan is
inappropriate. Prior to the amendment, MCR 9.104 merely pro-
67. Since the majority issued no opinion explaining the basis for the
decision, the reasons for the court's shift in position is unclear. The court changed
its composition and one new member, Justice Archer, was an advocate for the
IOLTA proposal while president of the State Bar. It may also be that the court
was moved by the very earnest brief personally prepared by State Bar President
George Roumell. The brief opens with the admirable directness and sincerity for
which Mr. Roumell is well known: "If the poor of our state do not have access
to justice, then we are depriving that segment of our population of its freedom.
This is the reason why this President opted to write this Brief, rather than to
show up another Bar function, for this is critical to our entire system of justice."
Brief by George Roumell to the Michigan Supreme Court (April 7, 1986) (on file
at The Wayne Law Review).
68. MicH. CT. R. 9.104.
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vided that an adjudication of misconduct in another jurisdiction
"is evidence of misconduct" in a Michigan proceeding.
An amendment to MCR 9.1209 similarly limited collateral
attacks on a criminal conviction used as a basis for discipline. The
amendment did not alter the section of the rule which stated that
the judgment of conviction is conclusive proof that the crime was
committed; the amendment, however, added a specific prohibition
against raising "questions as to the validity of the conviction,
alleged trial errors, and the availability of appellate remedies" in
a disciplinary proceeding. 70
B. Procedure
The amendments added two pre-hearing procedures. First, the
limited right to discover documentary evidence and the identity of
witnesses previously afforded to respondents was extended to the
Attorney Grievance Administrator.71 Second, a hearing panel is
required to order, on its own motion, an independent medical
examination of any respondent who alleges that discipline should
be mitigated due to the attorney's physical or mental impairment.72
The amendments include an important change to the actual
hearing procedure itself. Hearings are now bifurcated with the first
hearing limited to the issue of misconduct.7 3 Should the panel
conclude that misconduct was involved, then a second hearing is
held regarding the imposition of discipline. 74 The two hearings can
take place consecutively on the same day, but the hearing panel
cannot address the issue of discipline until after misconduct has
been established. The effect of this bifurcation is to prevent
evidence relevant only to discipline, such as prior misconduct or





72. Id. 9.121(C)(2). MIcH. CT. R. 9.121 provides that discipline may be
mitigated to probation for an impaired attorney. The amendment was no doubt
motivated by concerns that the impairment defense has been abused and that
some hearing panels too readily accept the defense without adequate proof. See
Dubin & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 28. Under the amended rule, should the
respondent fail to appear for an ordered examination, the sanction is ineligibility
for probation.




A final procedural change affects the Board proceedings. Mi-
chigan Court Rule 9.110(B)75 provides that two out of the seven
members of the Board must be laypersons. A former provision in
MCR 9.118(C)(1), which required that at least one lay member be
present whenever the Board held a hearing, has been deleted. The
Board currently has a quorum if three members are present, even
if all three are attorneys. 76 This change is particularly significant
in light of the supreme court's rejection of another amendment,
proposed by the Grievance Commission, which would have re-
quired that each hearing panel, currently consisting exclusively of
attorneys, include one lay member. 77 The Grievance Commission
argued that the same policy which required non-lawyer participa-
tion in attorney discipline at the Board level should also mandate
such participation on hearing panels. The court responded by
rejecting an expanded role for non-lawyers and retreating from
the existing commitment to lay participation in Board hearings. It
is troubling that the court made this significant policy decision
without explanation or explicit recognition. The staff comment to
amended MCR 9.118 discusses four changes to that rule without
acknowledging the elimination of the lay participation requirement.
The explanation for the change may be found in a letter sent
by the State Bar to the court opposing the Grievance Commission's
proposal for lay participation in hearing panels. Arguing that lay
participation in hearing panels would be administratively unwork-
able, the State Bar noted that the Board has not been able to
75. Id. 9.110(B).
76. Id. 9.118(C)(1).
77. The Grievance Commission proposal would have amended MICH. CT.
R. 9.111(A) to read in part:
The board must annually appoint 2 attorneys and 1 non-attorney to
each hearing panel and must fill a vacancy as it occurs. A vacancy
occasioned by the absence of an attorney must be filled by another
attorney; a vacancy occasioned by the absence of a non-attorney must
be filled by another non-attorney. The chairman, who shall make all
rulings of evidence, must be a lawyer.
Even even had the court adopted this proposal, however, hearing panels would
have been able to convene and act without a lay member present since any two
members would constitute a quorum. Contrast this quorum requirement with the
former rule governing Board hearings that required the presence of a lay member
for a quorum. The Grievance Commission proposal was published by the supreme
court for comment on September 22, 1986 together with the amendments ulti-
mately adopted. See Proposed Amendments to MCR 9.101, 9.104, 9.106, 9.111
- 9.116, and 9.118 - 9.128; and Proposed New MCR 9.132, 65 MmcH. B.J. 1028-
34 (1986).
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arrange to have both lay members present at any of its sessions.78
In light of this sad admission, the amendment to MCR 9.118(C)(1)
appears to be a concession by default to the lack of commitment
by the lay Board members. Allowing the Board to function without
their participation, however, seems an inadequate response to the
problem. It is difficult to believe that there are no qualified non-
lawyers willing to attend all Board proceedings. The Board should
report to the court those current lay members that lack the requisite
interest, commitment, or available time, and replacements should
be identified. On the other hand, should the amendment to MCR
9.118(C)(1) reflect a policy decision that lay participation in attor-
ney discipline is no longer an important value, the court would be
more candid to delete the requirement that two of the seven Board
members be non-lawyers rather than exclude non-lawyers from the
quorum definition.
C. Sanctions
In addition to the changes regarding sanctions implemented by
the amendments to Chapter 9 of the Michigan Court Rules, the
Board decided three cases in which it established an important
policy mandating minimum sanctions for defaulting respondents.
In both Schwartz v. Moray79 and Schwartz v.Evans0 the respondent
failed to comply with the Request for Investigation, to answer the
formal complaint, and to appear at the hearing. 81 The hearing
panel in Moray merely reprimanded the absent respondent 2 and
78. Letter from Michael Franck, Executive Director, State Bar of Michi-
gan, to Al Lynch, Chief Commissioner, Michigan Supreme Court 4 (February
26, 1986) (on file at The Wayne Law Review). The Board wrote separately in
opposition to the Grievance Commission's proposal but did not mention difficulty
in securing lay member attendance. Letter from John F. VanBolt, Executive
Director, Attorney Discipline Board, to Al Lynch, Chief Commissioner, Michigan
Supreme Court 2-3 (February 27, 1987) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
79. No. DP 143/86 (Mich. Att. Discipline Bd. filed Mar. 4, 1987) (on file
at The Wayne Law Review).
80. Nos. DP 23/86, DP 60/86 (Mich. Att. Discipline Bd. filed Mar. 4,
1987) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
81. Failure to answer a request for investigation or a formal complaint is
misconduct and grounds for discipline. MlcH. CT. R. 9.104(7).
82. The panel chairperson explained the decision by stating: "We ...
share the concern that Mr. Moray has apparently dropped off the face of the
earth and not communicated with the State Bar Grievance Administrator [sic]
and that is a legitimate concern. On the other hand, there are any number of
plausible explanations for that, which do not subject [him to] misconduct. . .
Moray, No. DP 143/86 at 2.
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the panel in Evans only imposed a 60-day suspension. After a
general statement of the importance of requiring attorneys to
respond to discipline proceedings, the Board in both decisions
increased the sanction to a 120 day suspension and announced a
policy of minimum sanction: "As a general rule, respondents who
fail to answer the Request for Investigation, fail to answer the
Formal Complaint and fail to appear at the hearing should be
suspended for a minimum period of 120 days . .. .81
At the time of the Evans and Moray decisions, a suspension of
an attorney for more than 119 days remained in effect until a
hearing panel granted a petition for reinstatement. In order to
prevail in a petition for reinstatement the respondent attorney must
establish by clear and convincing evidence his compliance with the
discipline imposed and his current fitness to practice law. Thus, a
defaulting respondent remained indefinitely suspended until he
came forward and petitioned for reinstatement; at the reinstatement
hearing the respondent had to explain his failure to respond. Now,
under the amended rules, the minimum period required to trigger
the petition for reinstatement procedure is increased from a 120
day suspension to a 180 day suspension. 84 However, given the
rationale behind both the Moray and Evans Board's imposition of
a minimum suspension of 120 days, it seems likely that the Board
would now require a minimum suspension of 180 days.
In Schwartz v.Glenn, 5 the respondent also failed to answer
the Request for Investigation and the formal complaint, but he
did appear at the hearing. The hearing panel merely imposed a
reprimand, which the Board increased to a thirty day suspension.
As in Evans and Moray, the Board took the opportunity to
announce a minimum sanctions policy:
Our decision ... is intended to serve notice upon ... the
Bar that the lawyer who ignores the duty imposed by Court
Rule to answer Requests for Investigation and Formal
Complaints does so at his or her peril and that, absent
83. Evans, No. DP at 3; Moray, No. DP 143/86 at 5.
84. MIcH. CT. R. 9.106(A)(2). Proposed amendments to MICH. CT. R.
9.123 and id. 9.124, governing reinstatement eligibility and procedures, remain
under consideration by the court. As a result, these two rules still refer to the
shorter minimum suspension period creating a technical inconsistency within
Chapter 9 of the Michigan Court Rules.
85. No. DP 91/86 (Mich. Att. Discipline Bd. filed Feb. 23, 1987) (on file
at The Wayne Law Review).
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exceptional circumstances, that attorney may expect disci-
pline greater than a Reprimand. 86
The amended rules now provide that if suspension is imposed, the
minimum period of suspension must be 30 days. 87 Thus, discipline
greater than a reprimand by definition would be a minimum
suspension of 30 days.
The recent amendments added another minimum sanction rule.
Michigan Court Rule 9.128 already provided that when discipline
is imposed the respondent must reimburse the State Bar for costs
allocable to the hearing and that payment of costs must be a
condition of reinstatement. 8 As amended, MCR 9.128 requires an
automatic suspension if costs are not paid within the prescribed
period. This suspension remains in effect until either costs are paid
or a hearing panel or the Board approves a payment plan. 9 In
addition, other amendments allowing hearing panels to add con-
ditions to a reprimand such as a requirement of continuing legal
education, reformed office operations, or personal counselling 9°
and allowing interim suspension pending final decision on a formal
complaint, provide further flexibility in imposing sanctions. 9'
The final significant change in the rules regarding sanctions is
an expanded revision of MCR 9.119 governing the conduct of
suspended attorneys. The amended rule sets forth with particularity
the kind of notice suspended attorneys must provide both their
clients and all tribunals in which the attorney was representing a
client in litigation. Restrictions on the practice of law and on the
sharing of legal fees are also specified in detail. 92
86. Id. at 5-6. The sanction in Glenn was based solely on the failure to
respond to the request for investigation and the complaint. The hearing panel
dismissed the underlying complaint of misconduct despite the default entered
against the respondent. The Board reversed the dismissal, holding that the panel
was bound to take the Grievance Administrator's allegations as true because of
the default. (Although the respondent appeared at the hearing, he did not move
to set aside the default.) However, the Board only reprimanded the respondent
on the underlying complaint. Board member Patrick J. Keating dissented to the
extent of supporting the panel's decision to require the Grievance Administrator
to submit proofs on the defaulted complaint and then make an independent
decision on the merits of the complaint.








The court did not adopt the most controversial proposed
amendment regarding minimum sanctions. The Attorney Grievance
Commission had advocated the adoption of a habitual offender
rule that would require a minimum suspension of 180 days for a
second finding of misconduct, three years for a third finding of
misconduct, and disbarment for a four-time offender. In vigorous
opposition to the proposal, both the State Bar and the Attorney
Discipline Board argued that unfettered discretion in setting dis-
cipline should remain vested in the Board subject only to review
on leave by the Michigan Supreme Court.
Regardless of the merits of the Grievance Commission's un-
successful proposal, which indeed may have been too inflexible
and heavy-handed, the problem of unrestricted discretion in im-
posing discipline deserves continuing attention. Apart from the
Board's recent decisions on minimum sanctions for defaulting
respondents, hearing panels imposing discipline have little guid-
ance.
In 1986, the ABA approved a fifty-four page document enti-
tled, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.93 These standards
categorize all potential disciplinary rule violations based on the
nature of the duty violated, the extent of actual or potential injury,
and the degree of intentionality. Each categorization corresponds
to a recommended level of sanction, ranging from disbarment to
admonition, adjustable if aggravating or mitigating circumstances
are present. The standards are not intended to be mandatory; their
purpose is to induce attorney discipline committees to consider
and weigh all relevant factors before imposing discipline and to
increase consistency in the treatment of the same or similar offen-
ses. 94
In 1987, the Board's Executive Director distributed copies of
this ABA publication to hearing panel members but did not give
specific guidance to the use of the standards.95 Adoption of the
93. Amt cA BNAt AssocrAuToN, STANDARDS FOR ImposioG LAwYER SANC-
ToNs (1986).
94. Id. § 1.3.
95. In his transmittal letter to hearing panel members, the Board's Exec-
utive Director indicated that neither the Michigan Supreme Court nor the Attorney
Discipline Board have adopted the ABA standards, and stated: "As with any
recognized reference or authority ... a hearing panel report may make reference
to a particular standard if it would be helpful in explaining a panel's decision."
Memorandum from John F. Van Bolt, Executive Director, Michigan Attorney
Discipline Board, to Hearing Panel Members (undated) (on file at The Wayne
Law Review).
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ABA standards by the Board, either by a directive or through a
decision, would represent a major advance in guiding the currently
unrestricted discretion of hearing panels in imposing sanctions.
Despite the possibility that hearing panels would often impose
sanctions different than those recommended by the ABA standards,
requiring panels to explain these differences based on the factors
outlined in the standards would result in better reasoned and more
principled hearing decisions. As a result, fewer decisions might be
appealed to the Board, which is now largely preoccupied with
adjusting the level of sanctions imposed by hearing panels.
D. Immunity
Prior to the 1987 amendments, MCR 9.125 provided persons
with immunity from suit for statements "made without malice and
intended for transmittal" to the Attorney Grievance Commission
or given in a discipline proceeding.96 The provision requiring
absence of malice was deleted and the rule now states that a person
"is absolutely immune" from suit for such statements. 97 The
amended rule also added the word "absolutely" in describing the
immunity afforded to hearing panel members, the Grievance Com-
mission, the Board, and the staff of both bodies for conduct
arising out of the performance of their duties. 9
IV. ATToRNEy MALPRACTICE
There were two reported malpractice cases during the Survey
period. They primarily addressed two issues specific to malpractice
law: limitations period and causation.
96. MIcH. CT. R. 9.125.
97. Id. The rule now specifies that the statements must have been trans-
mitted solely to the Grievance Commission instead of referring to "statements
intended for transmittal" to the Grievance Commission.
98. The absolute immunity created by MicH. CT. R. 9.125, of course,
does not provide a defense to an action based on federal law. Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980). Federal law extends absolute immunity
from suit for damages to judges, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978);
administrative law judges, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); and prose-
cutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Grievance Commission
and Board would reasonably seem to be entitled to similar immunity. See Lepley
v. Dresser, No. K86-199CA4, slip. op. (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 1988) (Gibson, J.)
(staff members of the Michigan Attorney Grievance enjoy absolute immunity
from liability in a federal civil rights action because they perform quasi-judicial




Under Michigan law the plaintiff must bring an action for
legal malpractice within two years of the date the attorney ceased
to serve the plaintiff or within six months after the plaintiff
discovered or should have discovered the existence of the claim,
whichever is later.19 In Dowker v. Peacock'00 the court of appeals
interpreted both prongs of this test. For the first prong, the court
held that the date on which the attorney ceased to serve the client
is the date a client discharges the attorney rather than the later
date when another attorney is formally substituted.' 0' In order to
apply the second prong the court was required to determine when
a claim for legal malpractice accrues and can thus be discovered
by a plaintiff. Because a malpractice claim accrues only when all
the necessary elements, including damages, have occurred, the court
held "that the period of limitation ... begins to run from the
time the result of the attorney's inaction or delay is irremedia-
ble." 102 The alleged malpractice in Dowker resulted from the
attorney's delay in prosecuting plaintiff's case to trial. Applying
its interpretation of the second prong, the court found that the
claim did not accrue until the defendant in the underlying action
filed bankruptcy before trial could be scheduled, even though
plaintiff had discharged his attorney over two years before the
defendant filed for bankruptcy. 03 The damage caused by the
alleged delay did not become identifiable until the defendant
became bankrupt and, thus, a malpractice action filed within six
months of the date of the bankruptcy filing was timely.
B. Causation
One of the most daunting barriers to plaintiffs in a legal
malpractice case is the "case within a case" doctrine of causation
followed in many jurisdictions. This doctrine requires a plaintiff
99. MIca. Cote,. LAws AwN. §§ 600.5805(4), .5838 (West 1987).
100. 152 Mich. App. 669, 394 N.W.2d 65 (1986) (per curiam).
101. Id. at 672, 394 N.W.2d at 66 (citing Berry v. Zisman, 70 Mich. App.
376, 379, 245 N.W.2d 758, 759 (1976); Basic Food Indus. v. Travis, Warren,
Nayer & Burgoyne, 60 Mich. App. 492, 496, 231 N.W.2d 466, 469 (1975)). In
Dowker, the client unequivocally and in writing discharged the attorney and the
attorney acknowledged this in writing. But see Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App.
589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981) (attorney responsible for representing client until
motion to withdraw granted if attorney initiated termination of representation).
102. 152 Mich. App. at 673, 394 N.W.2d 66.
103. Id. at 674, 394 N.W.2d at 67.
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who claims a case was lost in litigation due to attorney malpractice
to prove that but for the malpractice the plaintiff would have
prevailed in the underlying action. In Ignotov v. Reiter,104 the
Michigan Supreme Court split three to three over the application
of this doctrine, thus affirming by equal division the court of
appeals decision against the plaintiff. 05
The underlying "case within a case" in Ignotov was an action
by a divorced woman to terminate her ex-husband's parental rights,
in part for failure to pay child support. The woman offered to
settle in exchange for payment of back support and increased
future support. The ex-husband told his attorney that he was
unwilling to pay child support, and counsel in turn advised him
that termination of parental rights was likely absent payment.
Apparently frustrated with his client's intransigence, the ex-hus-
band's attorney failed to either notify his client of the court hearing
or to appear on his behalf. At the hearing, the ex-husband lost
his parental rights.
Writing- on behalf of himself and Chief Justice Williams,
Justice Levin advanced a novel argument for the allegedly aggrieved
client. Conceding that the plaintiff failed to prove that he would
have prevailed at the hearing if properly represented, Justice Levin
suggested that the claimed loss was not the parental rights per se
but rather a lost settlement opportunity which had determinable
value. According to Justice Levin, had counsel continued profes-
sionally competent representation he might have succeeded in
shifting his client's position before the hearing and negotiated a
settlement that would have preserved parental rights in exchange
for payment of an amount of support acceptable to his client.
1 6
Justice Boyle also would have found for the plaintiff but not
on the grounds advanced by Justice Levin. She limited the loss of
settlement approach to cases, unlike Ignotov, in which the attorney
failed to disclose a settlement proposal to the client or failed to
offer an authorized settlement proposal to the other party.107 She
would have required the plaintiff to prove that his attorney's
104. 425 Mich. 391, 390 N.W.2d 614 (1986).
105. Chief Justice Williams and Justices Levin and Boyle would have
reversed; Justices Riley, Brickley, and Cavanagh voted to affirm; Justice Archer
took no part in the decision.
106. 425 Mich. at 397, 390 N.W.2d at 616. Justice Levin's opinion contains
the following sage advice: "Even stubborn clients are entitled to continued
representation." Id. at 398, 390 N.W.2d at 616.
107. Id. at 401, 390 N.W.2d at 618.
1030 [Vol. 34:1005
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
malpractice caused the loss of his parental rights, but would have
reversed the court of appeals for demanding that the plaintiff
show that the malpractice was "the" proximate cause rather than
merely "a" proximate cause. 108
Justice Riley, writing for herself and Justices Brickley and
Cavanagh, would have affirmed the court of appeals decision as
a proper application of the "case within a case" approach, al-
though agreeing with Justice Boyle that the plaintiff need only
prove that the malpractice was "a" proximate cause.' °9 She criti-
cized Justice Levin's approach as an attempt to circumvent the
"case within a case" doctrine." 0
Because the court was unable to muster a majority in the
Ignotov case, the proper application of the "case within a case"
doctrine is unclear. The Ignotov decision reflects the difficulty of
applying the doctrine in a way that is fair to the defending attorney
without creating impossible proof problems for the plaintiff.
108. Id. at 400-01, 390 N.W.2d at 617-18.
109. Id. at 402 n.1, 390 N.W.2d at 618 n.1.
110. Id. at 404 n.3, 390 N.W.2d at 619 n.3.
19881

